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Abstract 
This paper documents financial aspects of transactions and trade credit supply behavior 
with foreign direct investment (FDI) among small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
based on two original surveys. The surveys, conducted in four cities in China in 2003, 
were designed to uncover the nature of inter-firm transactions, trade credit and other 
financial conditions. Literature on FDI mainly refers to technology transfer, 
employment, or investment. This paper focuses on the role/significance of FDI in the 
supply of trade credit due to its enforcement technology of trade credit.   
 
Yanagawa, Ito, and Watanabe (2006) developed an incomplete contract model wherein 
when the seller has a higher enforcement technology or the buyer has richer liquidity, 
both trade credit and transaction volume will increase. In this paper we first compute 
the “enforcement probability” of each seller then test the propositions of the model. We 
confirm that (1) FDI and G firms provide larger trade credit. (2) This is due to their 
higher enforcement probability in trade credit. Furthermore, (3) higher enforcement 
probability has a positive external effect in enhancing the trade credit and transaction 
volume of indirect transaction partners.   
 
However, we also find that (4) in order to raise the probability of “no default,” enhancing 
the ratio of cash on delivery is a necessary measure. (5) A more competitive supplier will 
prefer cash on delivery payment and consequently will provide less trade credit to the 
economy. (6) With a shorter transaction period, the supplier will provide larger trade 
credit. This implies that firms with a stronger bargaining power prefer providing no 
trade credit though they can expect higher enforcement probability, thus reduces the 
volume of economic activity. These negative forces against enhancing trade credit and 
economic activity exist at a substantial level in China. Because of this force, a strategic 
default problem persists in China even 30 years after the transition began. 
 
Key word: incomplete contract, trade credit, spillover of technology, FDI, government 
owned firms 
JEL Classification: O5, K0, G2, P31  3
1.  Introduction  
The role of FDI in the host country’s economy are mainly argued with a reference to 
technology transfers in terms of production, management etc. This paper will focus on 
another important aspect: how transactions with FDI will contribute to financial 
condition of domestic firms; credit on the transactions, risk sharing on the transactions. 
All inter-firm transactions have financial aspects by nature. Financial function refers 
here to the provisions of (a) credit or financial resources, (b) payment /settlement 
function and instruments, (c) risk management, (d) incentive control. The supply of 
goods or service from supplier to buyer accompanies payment in the opposite directions. 
This payment contract often generates a provision of credit or risk-sharing when supply 
of goods and payment has a time difference. Further, payment contract also be provided 
with incentive mechanisms, e.g., linkage between quality assessment and payment.     
These financial functions are substantially subject to institutions, not only in the 
developed economies, but particularly in developing economies or transitional 
economies. Institutions refereed here are legal institutions such as civil law, company 
law, security law and courts, and other enforcement entities who implement decisions 
by the court. China is an good example to observe and understand how the institutions 
affect financial aspects of inter-firm transaction, because the legal institution for firms 
operates in China have been distinguished by ownership type, roughly speaking, as 
public owned firms (state-owned firms and collective-owned firms), private firms and 
foreign-owned firms (FDI). In practice, firms operating in China have complained of 
vicious late payment practices, which called triangle debt in Chinese, have been policy 
agenda since the late 1980s and up to the present.   
In China, where numerous FDI firms are operating, what is their contribution to 
Chinese economy? Usually, it is in the spillover of technology. However, this paper will 
focus on financial aspects of FDI contribution, particularly the flow of financial 
resources via trade credit. FDI enhances trade credit volume in China, via this channel, 
contributes to improve financial environment of Chinese economy. The first contribution 
of this paper is to document this point, i.e., FDI provide more trade credit with Chinese 
economy, based on data. 
Why then FDI have positive effect to increase trade credit? Theoretically, two 
hypotheses are in contest. The first one claims that FDI can provide larger trade credit 
due to abundant cash and liquidity. The other claims that FDI has a more effective 
technology with which to prevent or manage the strategic default of buyer, thus they 
can provide larger liquidity. This paper will show that the latter argument is more 
consistent with data. This is the second contribution of this paper.  4
2.  Analytical framework 
 
2.1    Theoretical model 
Yanagawa, Ito and Watanabe[2006] developed a model of trade credit provision under 
an environment where contract enforcement is imperfect. A rough description of the 
model is as follows: We have one buyer and one seller, who will make a contract on 
transaction of goods. The goods X are traded at price P, the buyer will make a payment 
T out of PX when the goods are delivered from the seller. Buyer will benefit V(X)=vX by 
trading this product, and the cost function of the seller is C(X)=cX. Trade volume X will 
be endogenously determined in the negotiation process between buyer and seller. We 
also assume that v and c are exogenously given and v>c. 
At date 1 buyer and seller agree to trade product and specify payment schedule. In 
order to delivery the product at date 1, the seller incurs the cost for production cX The 
goods X are traded at price P, the buyer will make a cash on delivery-payment T, out of 
PX when the goods are delivered from the seller. The residual PX-T is a volume of trade 
credit from the seller to buyer1. When the enforcement of this trade credit contract is 
imperfect, the buyer has an incentive not to pay (PX-T). 
To formulate the strategic default incentive by the buyer, we assume that the seller 
can seize only a part of buyer’s benefit, svX when the default occurs. We call s as 
enforcement technology of the seller and we assume s<1.  Here, the buyer, or the 
receiver of trade credit, does not have to repay (1-s)vX. Under this situation, the 
contracted price P is almost meaningless, because regardless of the contracted price P, 
the both party may expect that the buyer will default and the seller gets only svX.  
Hence, the seller can expect to receive,       
   Min[PX-T,  svX].   
We also assume the buyer will have 100% bargaining power, and also has a cash 
amount of A. The buyer will solve the following problem, 
  
        Max  A+vX-T-Min[PX-T,  svX] 
         s . t .   T + M i n [ P X - T ,   s v X ] > _ c X   : Individual rationality condition of the seller 
                                 A > T .     :   Cash constraint of the buyer 
 
                                                  
1  Theoretically, trade credit might be given from the buyer to seller in the form of 
prepayment. But this is recognized as marginal in practical, our survey also confirmed 
these point.  5
  By solving this problem, we obtain the following results; 
 
Proposition 1.  As long as c>sv holds, the equilibrium transaction volume contracted 
price and cash on delivery payment and trade credit become; 
                  X * =   A / ( c - s v )  
       P*>=  c 
                  T * = A  
      P*X*-T*=  svA/(c-sv)   
 
Proposition 2 The equilibrium trade volume X*and trade credit P*X*-T* are increasing 
function of cash held by the buyer, A and enforcement technology of the seller, s. 
 
This results implies that enforcement mechanism or enforcement technology of the 
seller, is important for trade volume, hence the profit of the buyer (not only that of the 
seller, whose technology level affects trade and credit volumes). When a firm buys goods 
from the supplier and will sell their products to the customer, transaction between the 
firm and the supplier may affect the transaction between the firm and the customer, or 
vice versa. The model in Yanagawa, et.al.[2006] shows that A will affect others through 
changes in trade volume and cash in hand. 
 
Proposition 3: The equilibrium trade volume and trade credit from the supplier to the 
firm are increasing functions of the enforcement technology of the surveyed (customer) 
firm2. Enforcement technology has an external effect to enhance both trade and trade 
credit volumes.   
  
 
2.2  Empirical  questions  
In Yanagawa, et.al[2006], we placed the government-owned firms in a middle of 
transaction chain, and confirmed that the government–owned firm have a positive  
effect on payment enforcement based on the survey data at Yibin City, Sichuan Province 
(see IDE-DRC Survey below), where actually no FDI were operating. This paper will 
take the firm in between of supplier and customer as the FDI firms. If the FDI has a 
high enforcement technology on payment, it may increase trade credit and transactions 
in the host country. If enforcement technology of payment enforcement have external 
                                                  
2  See proof and detailed structure of the model in Yanagawa, et.al[2006]. 
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effect, and enhances trade volume and trade credit, the FDI play a very important role 
in the financial aspect. This financial function also needs to be recognized as a positive 
role of FDI.     
Applying propositions in the model analysis above into this empirical motivation, our 
empirical questions here are as follows; 
Q.1    Does a transaction with FDI provide credit to domestic firms? Is it bigger than 
other ownership firm does? 
Q.2    If the answer for Q1 is yes, then, why FDI can provide larger trade credit?   
Our model predicts that when the strategic default may occur, trade credit are 
provided more when the buyer are more liquid and the seller has a higher “enforcement 
technology” from the incomplete contract framework. If strategic default will not occur 
definitely, trade credit will be provided more only because the seller is more liquid.  
Hypotheses in contest here are in short;   
H1  Because FDI are only more liquid to others, they provide larger trade 
credit regardless of enforcement technology. This presumes a world with absence of 
strategic default.   
    H 2   B e c a u s e   F D I   h a v e   h i g h e r   e n f o rcement technology as well as liquidity, FDI 
will provide larger trade credit. This presumes a world of strategic default. 
Q.3  If H2 in Q2 is confirmed to be supported, then, does the FDI’s enforcement 
technology have positive external effect in trade credit enforcement? 
 
In this paper, we are interested in a role of FDI in payment contract enforcement and 
trade credit provision. Thus, our main concern in this paper is with the impact of 
enforcement technologies on trade credit provisions34.  
                                                  
3  For cash in hand, A, it is not easy as well to tell which variable should be selected. For 
example, first we have to choose cash asset on the asset liability table or cash flow. Among 
cash flows, we have information on net cash flow in or gross cash flow, or cash flow in sales, 
or cash flow from financial activity that might be related to loan from bank or other external 
parties. The PBOC-JICA survey contains information on firm’s transactions with bank and 
on bank information. Detailed test on cash constraint will be possible.   
4  Institutional factors or institutions may affect enforcement of payment schedule of trading 
contracts, or the buyer’s incentive to default. In the case of China, following institutions may 
matter: 
(a)Ownership 
In China, corporate activities have been regulated according to ownership types: until 
corporate law got effective in 1993, state owned enterprises were established based on “State 
Owned Enterprise Law” enacted in 1988, town and village enterprises was established 
under the “Town and Village Enterprises Accounting Rule” introduced in 1986 or the “Town 
and Village enterprises Law” enacted in 1996.  Private enterprises are governed by their 
regulations and Foreign Direct Investment Enterprises are regulated under Foreign Direct 
Investment Law and related regulations respectively. Even after the Corporate Law came  7
   
3.    Data and Descriptive Statistics   
3.1  Data 
Data we have collected consists of two surveys: the one was conducted at Yibin City, 
Sichuan Provinces, in January 2003, conducted by Development Research Center and 
Institute of Developing Economies (hereafter called DRC-IDE survey). The other was 
conducted by People’s Bank of China, commissioned by Japan International 
                                                                                                                                                  
into force, individual firms are regulated under their respective legal ground until they 
were reformed to the company under the corporate law. Each law provides for target 
category firms with clauses on financing, profit distribution and accounting rules. 
Among these laws and regulations, there were no unified rules or principles. On the 
other hand, although legal systems are very complicated, there remains a substantial 
ambiguity within which companies to operate. These defects of laws and regulations 
were alleviated by administrative  action.    
Regarding contract enforcement, institutions influential on trade credit and other 
financial demands and supplies, are presumably different from each other according to 
ownership type. At least until re-entry of WTO, FDI companies regulations are distinct 
from domestic company regulations. Domestic companies also differ from each other 
under different legal regulations; publicly owned firms and private firms. Therefore, 
when we take a look into the nature of transactions on SMEs in China, it would be 
reasonable to classify the SMEs in our survey into three groups by ownership type: the 
first is FDI, the second is the government-owned enterprise, which includes state owned 
and collective owned enterprises (town and village enterprises) (G), the thirdly, 
privately owned enterprises (P).     
 
(b) Payment instruments 
When thinking about payment enforcement, the selection of payment instruments is 
important, and the functions that each instrument plays are subject to institutions of 
home economy.  In our survey, the surveyed firms are asked to describe the share of 
following six payment instruments; (1) cash, (2) cheques, (3) bank note (4) bank draft, 
(5) commercial draft and (6) credit card. (1) cash is an instrument the seller prefers most 
and does not allow for any trade credit. (2) A cheque is an instrument whereby bank will 
guarantee the payment up to the cash amount in bank account of the buyer. (3) A bank 
note is a payment instruments offered by bank, usually for payment between remote 
areas. Local banks for each home city will guarantee the settlement within the amount 
of the buyer’s account. For cheques and bank notes, bank will be responsible for 
payment as long as the buyer’s account holds sufficient cash. For (4) bank draft, bank 
will take a further risk in China. When the buyer makes a payment by bank draft, the 
bank will guarantee the whole amount of payment, regardless of liquidity of the buyer. 
In the market economy, draft is issued based on the credit of the issuer, or buyer firms, 
it is rare that a draft is issued based on credit of bank for issuer firms. In China, (5) a 
commercial draft corresponds to draft in the market economy.  Since the reform and 
transition to market economy began in China, strategic default by the buyer firms has 
been so prevalent that it was very difficult to issue a draft only based on credit of firms. 
Bank draft is a unique institutional arrangement that was introduced in order to 
conquer a problem of strategic default by issuers of draft. (6) Credit card is a payment 
instruments that card-issuing company will provide short -term credit for payment.   
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Cooperation Agency, at Beijing Municipal City, Dongguan City, Guangdong Provinces 
and Xi’an City, Shaanxi Provinces in December 2003 (hereafter called PBOC-JICA 
Survey). The two surveys are implemented using a very similarly structured 
questionnaire in the section concerning inter-firm transactions, thus we have been able 
to pool the two surveys here to analyze firm’s behavior trade credit. 
 
<Figure 1 Map of survey sites> 
 
The survey consists of 465 private enterprises, 124 government enterprises and 49 
FDI firms; 638 firms in total (Table 1). Beijing has the largest number, 26, of FDI 
companies, but Yibin has no FDI among surveyed firms, whose data are utilized in 
Yangawa et.al[2006] to document the positive role of government owned firms, has no 
FDI among surveyed firms.   
Sample selection mechanisms are as follows; For DRC-IDE Survey at Yibin, the 
surveyed firm were listed mainly from networking of Yibin City Government. Though it 
might be presumable this may be biased toward to increase government-owned firms, it 
covers around a half of the firms in the city, we can regard it more or less same as 
census of the city ( see Yanagawa, et. al [2006].).    JICA-PBOC Survey was implemented 
by utilizing the local network of People’s Bank of China. The surveyed firms were 
primarily planned to list based on the Bank’s borrower’s list. However, it was found that 
the list contains a substantial share of virtual firms, thus we can expect extremely low 
collection rate of the survey if we take random sampling based on the Bank’s list. 
Therefore, we abandoned this strategy and took a procedure to list the firms based on 
the network of the local government, as the same with a case of Yibin. It is not explained 
what actually were the network of the local government was, thus we have no correct 
information on sample selection mechanism. We can imagine that the firms were listed 
mainly from the network of the government who has a frequent relationship between 
the governments or the People’s Bank of China, the central bank.   
  
< Table 1    Distributions of location and ownerships of surveyed firms> 
 
The survey was designed to ask the surveyed firm for the information on transactions 
with (1) a customer firm located inside of home city of the surveyed firms, (b) a customer 
outside the home city, (3) a supplier located in the home city, (4) a supplier outside of the 
home city (Figure 2). Target transaction partners were selected on the principle of being 
the largest company to have active transactions with the surveyed firms at the time of  9
the implementation of the survey. The distinction by city border was motivated to 
capture the influence of administrative action or enforcement, when legal enforcement 
in China are often criticized as being too weak.   
 
<Figure2    Information structure of the survey> 
 
 
3.2    Profiles of Transactions with FDI: Descriptive statistics 
 
3.2.1    Trade credit and Transaction volume 
We are interested in what factor affects trade credit supply, furthermore, transaction 
volume. Firstly, we take a look at what actually happens in two endogenous variables in 
the model, trade credit(Table1) and transaction volumes(Table2). Concerning the size of 
trade credit, other than accounts receivable or payables on asset liability tables, we 
surveyed the ratios of (1) payment after delivery, (2) cash on delivery, and (3) 
prepayment, where the sum of these three factors is supposed to be 100 per cent. As we 
found that size of (3) prepayment is marginal, here we do not consider net trade credit 
( (1) – (3) ), but take the gross share of (1) payment after delivery ratio as a ratio of trade 
credit, (PX-T)/X  in the model description, and (2) cash on delivery as T, payment at 
date 1 in the model.   
Table 1 shows ratios of trade credit in sales (credit is given by the surveyed firm to the 
customers), and trade credit in procurement (credit is received by the surveyed firms 
from the suppliers). In customer-surveyed firms’ transactions, trade credit ratios 
towards FDI or Government-owned firms are all beyond 70 per cent in terms of median, 
particularly from FDI seller to FDI or Government-owned customers are as high as 90 
per cent. On the contrary, when Private firm is a receiver of trade credit contract, all 
ownership type become conservative, and provides least share among the three types of 
ownership. As a supplier of credit, private firms seem to be conservative in that they 
provided the least share at each category. In surveyed firm-supplier transactions, we 
found a similar tendency, though it was less apparent.   
 
<Table 1 Ratio of payment after delivery in a transaction> 
 
Concerning transaction volume, although variances are much larger than with trade 
credit ratio, we can see that transaction from FDI to all ownership type are larger than 
from other types in terms of median. As receiver of credit, FDI and government owned  10
firms are more less the same in transaction volume. Similarly to trade credit ratio, 
private owned firms trades are no larger than others as both receiver and supplier of 
the credit. The descriptive data implies that FDI and Government-owned firms 
contribute to China’s economy as active providers of trade credit and enhancer of 
economic size.     
 
<Table 2    Transaction volume by ownership type> 
 
These descriptive statistics gives an answer to the first question of our empirical 
questions: Q.1  Does a transaction with FDI provide credit to domestic firms? Is it 
bigger than other ownership firm does? The answer looks “yes” from the above. 
 
 
3.2.2  Factors  of  enforcement technology 
How, then, are the factors related to enforcement technology or cash in hand? In our 
survey, following information are available; ownership types of trading partners, 
structure of payment instruments, geographical or administrative area information 
such as addresses of trading partner, share of market site, i.e., home city and export are 
shown here. Competitive conditions and experiences of default in trade credit and ex 
post management to the default incident are surveyed as well. Here we take a look at 
the nature of firms by ownership type between trading partners. 
  
(a)  Payment instruments 
Choice of payment instruments is important to manage default risk by the buyer. Table 
3 documents the share of payment instruments for each transaction between customers 
and surveyed firms. Here, we can find a distinction by ownership type. Among the six 
instruments, the cheque is the major in terms of both median and mean. The second 
most frequently used instrument is cash. It is interesting that FDI and private firms 
prefer cash as a buyer, but on the contrary, government-owned firms seems to prefer to 
receive cheques. Bank note follows the top two, and bank draft is the fourth place 
(Appendix  1).    
 
(b)  Geographical/administrative factors   
Arrangement for payment enforcement depends on where customers are located; 
Availability of payment instruments will change. For example, bank note is offered 
when settling payment between remote sites, cheques were originally introduced to  11
settle within local payments. In addition, the availability of information on customers, 
institutional arrangements to manage ex post when default occurs may depend on 
geographical or administrative distribution. Tables in Appendix 2 show shares of sales 
in export and home city of surveyed firms, classified by pairs of customer’s ownership – 
surveyed firm’s ownership. For export, FDI sellers, particularly FDI-FDI pairs, shows 
by far higher share to other ownerships does. On the contrary, more than half of total 
sales of G sellers are to the home city market, higher than other ownerships. Ownership 
types of buyer do not show systematic differences (Appendix 2 Marketing area). 
 
(c)  Competition 
To measure level competitive factors and bargaining power, following information are 
surveyed: (1)uniqueness of the product they sell to customer    (if the products is unique 
and =1, if it is a commodity =0)  (2) number of rivalry firms, in transaction with 
customer (This question is asked to answer in count data. If no competitor=0, few 
competitor=1, a few competitor=2, numerous competitor=3).  (3) Share of the products 
purchased among total inputs, (4) whether they have potential suppliers other than 
current transaction partner ( If yes=1, no=0).   
For uniqueness of goods, around 60 per cent transactions with FDI customers trade 
unique goods from the current supplier, those with private firms trade as low as   20 to 
40 per cent, those with Government owned firms traded    in a middle level of around 40 
to 50 per cent(Appendix 3 Competitiveness and bargaining power).   
 
(d) Default experience and its management 
To see how the firms manage default incidence, we set following questions: (1) Since 
1999 to 2003, whether faced with default by the buyer. (This questioned to choose 1 out 
of following 3 situations, 1. No default (yes=1, no=0), 2. Delayed payment that 
eventually paid in full (yes=1, no=0), 3. Complete default (yes=1, no=0). 
  For cases where FDI supplier sold products to FDI and private customers, higher 
shares of surveyed firms answered that they have not being defaulted (FDI 
customer-FDI surveyed firm answered 61 per cent in mean, FDI customer-private 
surveyed firms answered 51 per cent). On the contrary, these 2 pairs category firms 
answered lowest share to question whether they have been completely defaulted or not. 
For ex post management to a default incident, we cannot see systematic differences by 
ownership types in these descriptive statistics (Appendix 4 Default experience and ex 
post  management).    
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4. Estimation strategy   
4.1   Estimating “enforcement technology” 
Regarding empirical application, the problem is how to capture level of enforcement 
technology. All information we have is only proxy. Enforcement technology can be 
recognized as a composite of several factors; (a) payment instruments offered by 
financial institutions, (b) administrative and legal institution regarding enforcement of 
contracts, (c) competitiveness of the firms, and (d) ratio of cash on delivery. In our survey, 
we have the related information, but we do knot now how these factors comprise 
enforcement technology.   
Fortunately, we have information of default experiences in the recent four years on 
transactions with customers for each surveyed firms; (1) no default at all (yes=1, no=0), 
(2) have ever been delayed that eventually repaid( yes=1, no=0), (3) have ever been 
completely defaulted(yes=1, yes=0). We will estimate probability of enforcement for 
each these three proxies, explained by the factors of (a) to (d) above. We will define the 
probabilities of enforcement as follows; 
 
        Probability  of  enforcement (no default) = Prob(no default) 
        Probability  of  enforcement (non-delayed) = 1- Prob(delayed) 
        Probability  of  enforcement  (non-complete default)= 1- Prob(complete default)   
 
As the dependents are binary response variables here, probit estimator is useful. As 
we saw in the section of data, sample selection mechanisms for JICA-PBOC Survey was 
not clear, but we have no positive information that there were apparent bias in the 
sample selection that affects to trade credit provision. Thus, we do not care about 
sample selection bias.   
In our analytical setting, we consider our problem in a static or stationary status 
setting, where transaction partners are exogenously given, then the firm decides only 
the ratio or volumes of trade credit, and transaction volumes. This setting is practically 
realistic, as the firm will start negotiating on payment condition, that is, trade credit 
condition, after he fixed the trading goods and the trading partner. The reverse 
proceeding is not necessarily realistic, because if the credit is the key problem to choose 
trading goods and trading partner, firm does not have to giving up a transaction with 
the partner, by borrowing necessary cash from third party such as financial institutions.   
Thus, we consider probability of enforcement computed on the past experience shows 
their stationary status nature.    13
   
4.2   Testing  hypotheses  
The model in the previous section shows that, under an environment where strategy 
default by the buyer may occurs, and which is very presumable to case of China, 
amounts of trade credit and cash on delivery, and transaction volumes in equilibrium 
are determined as follows: 
  T r a d e   c r e d i t   f u n c t i o n ;                 P * X * - T * =   s v A / ( c - s v )   ,   
T r a n s a c t i o n   v o l u m e   f u n c t i o n ;          X * =   A / ( c - s v )          .   
                    Ratio of trade credit in a transaction;    (P*X*-T*)/X* = sv 
It is deducted that volume variables are an increasing function of A, cash in hand of the 
buyer, and s, enforcement technology of the seller, and ratio of trade credit is a function 
of s, enforcement technology. 
 
4.3 Estimation procedure 
(a) Fractional logit and exponential regression 
Data available for dependent variables in this paper are (a) ratio of payment after 
delivery, (b) transaction volume with four specific transaction partners (a customer 
inside home city, a customer outside home city, a supplier in home city, and a supplier in 
outside home city).   
The first case, ratio, is a fractional variable distributed in [0, 1]. Our data often take 
boundary values 0 or 1. In this case, fractional logit regression is proposed by Papke and 
Wooldridge[1996]. First we assume conditional expectation follows logistic functions;.   
 E(y|x) = exp(xβ)/[1+exp(xβ)] =G(xβ)   
This modeling allows us to predict vales for y in (0, 1).  Just as binary logit model, 
derivative of conditional expectation on xj is βj g(xβ)(g(xβ)=G’(xβ)). Here, we can 
take this model as a quasi maximum likelihood function as binary response model 
following logistic cdf function,   
l i(β)= yi  log[exp(xβ)/[1+exp(xβ)]]+ (1-yi) log[1- exp(xβ)/[1+exp(xβ)]]. 
Then, we can estimate β  by quasi maximum likelihood estimation. Here, yi can be 
take any value in [0, 1], but interpretation needs some caution as fractional values are 
regarded as a probability to choose value 1 (or zero) here. We will take fractional logit 
regression model to estimate trade credit ratio function, where dependent is ratio of 
payment after delivery.  14
The second type of dependent variables, trade credit and transaction volume, are a 
positive continuous response. Here, we take an approach to estimate exponential quasi 
maximum likelihood estimator, where log likelihood function is specified   as,  
  l i(β)= - yi  / m(x,  β)-  log[m(x,β)]. 
This estimator is consistent for βas long as m(x,  β) is correctly specified. Here, we 
assume m(x,β)=exp(xβ), as it is natural and not reasonable  that  trade  credit  volume 
or transaction volume follows exponential distribution. 
 
(b) Endogeneity of unobserved variables 
For independent variables, we have (a) characteristics of traded products, (b) nature of 
transaction partners. Some variables are continuous, and some are binary response or 
count data. As we have already argued, though we are interested in information 
representing “level of enforcement technology,” we do not have sufficient and necessary 
information which variables is correct variables, but only have proxies. Thus, our 
estimation might be suffered from an endogeneity problem from unobserved variables.   
As our data is a cross section data, it does not have time variant information for each 
individual entity, we cannot fully utilize panel data method to eliminate individual fixed 
effect. However, we have asked specific information on each two transactions for both 
sales and procurement for each firm so as to eliminate individual fixed characteristics 
by using fixed effect estimator.  However, unfortunately, we found data collection rate 
in our survey was not high, it was often missing multiple data for sales or procurement. 
This strategy was therefore abandoned later. Instead, we broadened definition of 
“individual” from “by firm” to “by ownership types”, as we are interested in behavior of 
FDI, compared to Government -owned firms or private firms. We did dummy variable 
regression by ownership-pairs, (i.e., 3 x 3= 9 dummies). By doing this, we were able to 
eliminate ownership type unobservable variables.       
Our empirical motivation here is to estimate trade credit, transaction functions in 
order to evaluate role of FDI firms in trade credit provision. As set out in the previous 
section, we have three empirical questions. Specification for each question and results 
will be shown in below. 
 
5.  Estimation  Result   
 
5.1 Probability of enforcement 
We have tree proxies for enforcement technologies or probability of enforcement, i.e., no  15
default dummy, delayed paid dummy and complete default dummy. Estimated 
coefficients of probit estimators on probability of enforcement are as in Table 3. Table 3 
presents two specifications by each proxy for probability of enforcement. The first 
specification have only (a) payment instruments and (b) ownership types pairs dummies 
as dependents, on the other hand, the second specification have other factors (c) 
administrative and regional factors, (d) competitiveness and length of transaction, (e) 
ratio of cash on delivery in a transaction.  For all three proxies, the ownership type 
pair dummy becomes insignificant in the second specification, but explanatory powers 
increase as we can see that log likelihood becomes larger. Thus, we take the second 
specification to obtain predicted probabilities of enforcement for the three dummies of 
enforcement probability.   
Qualitatively speaking, probit estimators for the three dummies shows an interesting 
result: (1) When the factors such as administrative/geographical, competition, 
transaction history, ratio of cash on delivery in a transaction ((c)-(e)) added into the 
dependents, ownership types dummies become insignificant. (2) COD ratio are 
significant for being “no default”, but “delayed, but be repaid eventually,” but 
insignificant for being “completely default.”   
 
<Table 3 > 
 
The predicted mean probabilities of enforcement based on three dummies are 
presented in Figure1. The probability based on the “no default” dummy shows the 
lowest in terms of both median and means, 0.31 and 0.33 respectively. The probability of 
“non-delay” shows the middle in median and means, 0.61 and 0.06. The median and 
means of the probability of “non-complete default” are 0.74 and 0.72. Comparing the 
distribution of sales transaction and procurement transaction for the surveyed firms, 
we cannot find a systematic difference. Table 4, 5 and Appendix 5 shows profiles of 
predict mean probability by ownership type pairs, both in sales and in procurement, and 
by city. In tables for ownership types pairs, we can see that the predicted mean 
probability of enforcement of FDIs towards FDI and private firms are high in terms of 
both median and mean for the no default dummy, and the non-complete default dummy. 
Those for private firms for the no default dummy and the non-complete default dummy 
are lower than other ownership types. Comparing sales transaction and procurement 
one, the differences above mentioned are more apparent in sales transactions. 
Concerning cities, we can see that the probability of enforcement is the highest in 
Beijing and Xi’an, and lowest in Dongguan for the no default dummy and the  16
non-complete default dummy in Appendix 5. It is interesting that the enforcement 
probability of Dongguan, where the economy is the most open and the most of FDIs in 
our surveys are operating, show the lowest probability of enforcement.       
 
<Table 4> 
<Table 5 > 
 
 
5.2  Testing  hypotheses   
Now we obtained the data on the enforcement probability, we will proceed to test our 
empirical hypotheses.     
 
5.2.1      Does a transaction with FDI provide credit to domestic firms?   
To test this question, we ran regressions on trade credit ratio, trade credit volume and 
transaction volume for both in sales and procurement transactions. The dependents are 
basically the same with probability estimation, that is, (a) payment instruments, (b) 
ownership types pairs, (c) administrative/geographical factors, (d) competition and 
bargaining power. Results are weakly systematic; (1) ownership-type pairs dummy are 
significant even when the administration and competition factors are added in the 
specification for the data of sales transaction and trade credit volume in procurement. 
Particularly, when G firm and FDI sells their products to FDI, and the private firms 
sells to G firms, they provided larger trade credit compared to the private firms sells to 
the private firms (See Appendix 6). (2) Trade credit ratio regression in procurement and 
transaction volume regression showed opposite results; ownership type pairs dummy 
become significant when other factors are added. (3) Ratio of cash payments are 
significantly negative to trade credit ratio and volume. 
The answer for Q1 is “yes” for the time being, but we had better say that FDI provides 
larger trade credit due to some functional reasons such as competitiveness, 
geographical and liquidity position, not but due to some ownership type fixed factors. 
The specifications (3), (6) and (9) added quadratic forms of s^ and estimation results 
supported that non-linearity of s^.    
  
 
5.2.2      Why, then, FDI can provide larger trade credit? 
 
  Hypotheses in contest here are;    17
H1  Because FDI are only more liquid to others, regardless of enforcement 
technology. 
        H2    Because FDI have higher enforcement technology as well as liquidity.   
 
To test questions above, we proceed to test structural function utilizing the enforcement 
probability data. First, in order to test which index of “enforcement probability” are 
desirable for our test, we ran trade credit ratio regression (Table 6 for trade credit ratio 
in sales transaction, and Table 7 for in procurement transaction).  When ratio of trade 
credit is regressed only by “enforcement probability s,” only the probability based on 
“non-complete default” dummy in sales transactions shows significant and positive 
signs, as the theory predicted.       
Table 8 shows a result of the trade credit function regression to test the H1 and H2. To 
test these hypotheses, we need information on “cash in hand of the buyer” and 
“ enforcement technology of the seller.” We have full information above only for those in 
procurement transaction, the test is run only for this procurement transaction.      First, 
in specification (0), we confirmed that cash flow and cash stock of the buyer matter 
trade credit volume. Then, we proceed to test whether the trade credit, in terms of 
volume, not ratio, can be explained by the enforcement probability. All three indexes 
show positive and significant coefficients, which is a consistent result with model 
prediction (Specification (1) (3)(5)). Furthermore, when we added cash flow and cash 
stock variables, the all coefficients of dependents are positive and significant. In this full 
specification ( (2) (4) (6); the dependents are the cash of the buyer and the enforcement 
probability of the seller), the log likelihood increased substantially, which indicated the 
full specification are more desirable. Table 9 shows similar results in transaction 
volume with what happened in the trade credit volume. 
These results supported that trade credit will be provided more when the enforcement 
technology of the seller is high and the buyer has more cash or liquidity. In the 
descriptive statistics and a test on Q1, where we can say that FDI provides larger trade 







5.2.3  Does  FDI’s  enforcement  technology have positive external effect?    18
Finally, we will move on to test whether the enforcement technology in trade credit has 
a positive external effect. The model indicated sequential trading induces positive 
external effect of enforcement technology. The enforcement technology of the surveyed 
firm is exercised towards their customer to secure their repayment of credit, and it is 
completely indifferent to a transaction between the surveyed firm and their supplier. 
Thus, we can check the existence of externality by testing whether credit given by the 
supplier is affected by the enforcement technology of the surveyed firm towards their 
customer.  We tested on both dependents here, trade credit ratio and trade credit 
volume. 
Table 10 shows similar results with tests in the previous sections; ratio of trade credit 
was not sufficiently explained by the enforcement power. However, in trade credit 
volume and transaction volume function, the enforcement probability of the buyer to 
their customer significantly and positively matter. Thus, we confirmed that a positive 
external effect of enforcement technology in trade credit existed in our data.     
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we tested and confirmed followings: (1) FDI and G contributed to 
provision of credit. (2) They can provide larger trade credit because of their higher 
“enforcement technology” which is measured by “enforcement probability” here, not 
because that they are liquid. The cash constraint of the buyer and the enforcement 
technology of the seller significantly matter a decision of trade credit provision by the 
seller, as a model in Yanagawa, et.al [2006] predicted. This result implies that strategic 
default seriously matters among SMEs in China. On the other hand,(3) their 
enforcement technology has a positive external effect towards China’s economy. This 
implies that the firms with higher enforcement technology keep on operating in China, 
the external effect of their technology will improve the enforcement probability of whole 
economy. 
However, we also found (4) in order to raise the probability of “no default,” enhance 
ratio of cash on delivery is a certain measure. But this will reduce volume of credit and 
economic transactions. (5) More competitive supplier will prefer cash on delivery 
payment, consequently, will provide less trade credit to the economy, (6) Shorter 
transaction period, the supplier will provide larger trade credit.  These findings 
implies that firms with stronger bargaining power prefers not providing trade credit, 
though they can expect to higher enforcement probability through their bargaining 
power.  These negative forces against enhancing trade credit and economic activity  19
substantially exist in China.  Because of this force, strategic default problem persists 
in China even after 30 years since the transition started.   
We mainly examined impact of trade credit enforceability on trade credit supply. But, 
how the other factor, “cash in hand of buyer,” is provided, by whom, were not argued 
here. We need further investigation.     
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(Source) Author.   
(Map) http://www.lonelyplanet.com/mapshells/nerth_east_asia/china/china.htm 21
Table 1    Distributions of location and ownerships of surveyed firms 
 
(Source) JICA-PBOC survey and IDE-DRC survey. 
Location and ownerships of surveyed firms
(# of firms) Beijing  Dongguang Xian Yibin Total
F D I 2 671 604 9
G4 185 6 1 9 1 2 4
P 133 91 150 91 465
Total 200 106 222 110 638 22
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Table 1    Ratio of trade credit in a transaction   
 
 
* Ratio of Payment after delivery
*Sales
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 90 100 77.38 30.97 21
G FDI 0 90 100 69.69 40.43 16
P FDI 0 30 100 49.00 39.39 40
FDI G 0 100 100 77.74 31.65 19
G G 0 70 100 60.40 41.68 85
P G 0 55 100 54.07 39.41 88
FDI P 0 67.5 100 58.89 38.60 36
G P 0 70 100 57.53 39.90 306




(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 60 100 68.42 32.87 19
G FDI 0 80 100 58.33 42.77 27
P FDI 0 50 100 49.28 42.63 118
FDI G 0 70 100 59.31 39.01 36
G G 0 30 100 44.62 39.32 79
P G 0 40 100 45.35 41.05 273
FDI P 0 70 100 65.33 33.35 15
G P 0 52.5 100 53.00 39.06 78
P P 0 70 100 55.51 39.30 319
(Source) IDE-DRC Survey, JICA-PBOC Survey 964
(Note) Boxed party I.e. buyer or seller, is the directly surveyed firms in our survey. 24
Table 2    Transaction Volume by ownership 
 
*Transaction volume   
*Sale
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 30 800 50000 3,518 11,073 20
G FDI 30 500 100000 6,055 23,452 18
P FDI 12 475 13960 1,497 2,995 26
FDI G 20 525 13960 1,567 3,615 14
G G 10 500 100000 3,000 12,481 65
P G 10 240 50000 1,759 6,392 73
FDI P 30 500 30000 1,926 5,929 25
G P 5 500 40000 1,733 4,495 261
P P 2.5 389 800000 4,102 44,924 318
*Procurement
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 8 983 25000 5,291 9,261 18
G FDI 1.8 145 20000 1,146 3,949 25
P FDI 2.5 200 9000 821 1,602 114
FDI G 43 575 5000 1,116 1,403 14
G G 1.5 565 22500 2,001 3,520 78
P G 1 315 28726 1,590 3,326 262
FDI P 10 300 10000 985 1,927 30
G P 5 300 19000 979 2,411 75
P P 2 320 80000 1,529 5,362 302
(Source) JICA PBOC survey 918
(Note) Boxed party I.e. buyer or seller, is the directly surveyed firms in our survey. 25
Table 3    Probit estimates on probability of enforcement   
(Source) Author.   
(Note) 1) Probit estimator. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate marginal effect when x 




Dependent  No default dummy  Delayed dummy Completely default
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Pseudo Log Likelihood -611 -432 -621 -465 -562 -406
Pearson Residuals(1/d 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02
AIC 1.29 1.23 1.31 1.33 1.19 1.17
# of obs 972 735 970 733 970 733
Coef. s.e. z P>|z| Coef. s.e. z P>|z| Coef. s.e. z P>|z| Coef. s.e. z P>|z| Coef. s.e. z P>|z| Coef. s.e. z P>|z|
Share of payment instruments (%)
cash -0.007 0.00 -4.63 0.00 -0.005 0.00 -1.27 0.20 -0.001 0.00 -0.64 0.52 0.003 0.00 0.79 0.43 -0.005 0.00 -3.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.49
cheque -0.006 0.00 -6.20 0.00 -0.006 0.00 -1.58 0.12 -0.002 0.00 -1.92 0.06 0.004 0.00 1.05 0.29 -0.004 0.00 -4.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.4
banknote -0.005 0.00 -4.10 0.00 -0.004 0.00 -1.17 0.24 -0.001 0.00 -0.97 0.33 0.006 0.00 1.37 0.17 -0.006 0.00 -5.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.94
bankdraft -0.009 0.00 -4.48 0.00 -0.010 0.00 -2.49 0.01 0.004 0.00 1.96 0.05 0.009 0.00 1.99 0.05 -0.008 0.00 -3.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.66
creditcard 0.013 0.01 2.49 0.01 0.016 0.01 2.57 0.01 -0.020 0.01 -3.03 0.00 -0.017 0.01 -2.19 0.03 -0.011 0.01 -1.95 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.76 0.45
(Commercial draft)
Buyer-Seller Ownerships (dummy)
dGG_C 0.07 0.16 0.47 0.64 -0.24 0.22 -1.09 0.28 -0.24 0.16 -1.56 0.12 -0.03 0.20 -0.16 0.87 0.11 0.16 0.71 0.48 0.30 0.22 1.40 0.16
dGF_C -0.44 0.36 -1.22 0.22 -0.72 0.38 -1.88 0.06 0.61 0.32 1.92 0.06 0.60 0.33 1.82 0.07 -0.46 0.36 -1.30 0.19 -0.01 0.37 -0.03 0.97
dGP_C 0.30 0.15 1.96 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.96 0.34 -0.36 0.16 -2.24 0.03 -0.31 0.18 -1.73 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.30 0.77 0.28 0.18 1.50 0.13
dFF_C 0.77 0.30 2.60 0.01 0.36 0.34 1.05 0.29 -0.52 0.32 -1.63 0.10 -0.37 0.36 -1.05 0.30 -0.45 0.34 -1.33 0.19 -0.05 0.37 -0.13 0.9
dFG_C -0.28 0.36 -0.77 0.44 -1.03 0.53 -1.93 0.05 -0.31 0.33 -0.93 0.35 -0.02 0.39 -0.06 0.95 0.42 0.32 1.28 0.20 0.76 0.39 1.95 0.05
dFP_C 0.29 0.22 1.34 0.18 -0.19 0.26 -0.72 0.47 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.97 0.16 0.26 0.62 0.54 -0.51 0.27 -1.93 0.05 0.01 0.30 0.03 0.98
dPG_C 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.87 -0.13 0.13 -0.98 0.33 -0.06 0.10 -0.58 0.57 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.86 -0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.90 0.15 0.14 1.13 0.26
dPF_C 0.00 0.23 0.01 1.00 -0.46 0.30 -1.54 0.12 -0.08 0.23 -0.35 0.73 0.07 0.26 0.28 0.78 0.00 0.24 0.01 1.00 0.37 0.27 1.35 0.18
(dPP_C)
Ratio of cash on delivery 0.52 0.12 4.44 0.00 0.65 0.14 4.51 0.00 -0.45 0.12 -3.80 0.00 -0.55 0.14 -3.98 0.00 -0.18 0.12 -1.51 0.13 -0.15 0.15 -1.01 0.31
Administarative region (dummy)
Beijing  0.47 0.15 3.09 0.00 0.80 0.11 -1.55 0.12 -0.26 0.15 -1.73 0.08
Dongguang 0.23 0.17 1.35 0.18 0.56 0.09 -3.50 0.00 0.41 0.17 2.46 0.01
Xian  0.43 0.15 2.81 0.01 0.86 0.12 -1.04 0.30 -0.25 0.15 -1.67 0.1
(Yibn)
Share of market site (%)
Home city  0.00 0.00 0.31 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.73 0.00 0.00 -1.27 0.2
Export 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.88 0.00 0.00 -1.34 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.99
Competitiveness of goods
Unique( If goods is unique to customer==1, IF  0.18 0.11 1.63 0.10 0.15 0.11 1.42 0.16 -0.43 0.11 -3.88 0
# of rival(no rivaly=0, few rival=1, a few rival= -0.12 0.06 -2.10 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.95 0.34 0.08 0.06 1.33 0.18
Length of transaction 
start year of transaction 0.00 0.00 -0.47 0.64 0.00 0.00 -1.34 0.18 -0.15 0.15 -1.01 0.31 26
Figure 1      Predicted mean probability of enforcement 
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  Table 4    Predicted probability of enforcement by ownership types, (1) in sales 
 
From F to C
 Probability of no default
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total Total 0.04 0.31 0.93 0.33 0.15 741
FDI FDI 0.24 0.52 0.81 0.49 0.13 18
G FDI 0.04 0.09 0.24 0.11 0.07 11
P FDI 0.17 0.42 0.90 0.42 0.15 29
FDI G 0.08 0.15 0.39 0.16 0.07 19
G G 0.09 0.23 0.87 0.26 0.13 51
P G 0.18 0.39 0.72 0.41 0.12 71
FDI P 0.07 0.20 0.42 0.23 0.09 27
G P 0.07 0.28 0.74 0.29 0.12 212
P P 0.08 0.36 0.93 0.37 0.14 303
741
 Probability of not payment delay
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total Total 0.21 0.61 1.00 0.60 0.13 741
FDI FDI 0.48 0.68 0.81 0.66 0.09 18
G FDI 0.35 0.57 0.81 0.62 0.15 11
P FDI 0.29 0.59 0.95 0.59 0.14 29
FDI G 0.21 0.28 0.53 0.32 0.08 19
G G 0.31 0.55 0.98 0.57 0.12 51
P G 0.58 0.71 0.85 0.70 0.07 71
FDI P 0.39 0.54 0.75 0.56 0.08 27
G P 0.30 0.59 0.86 0.59 0.13 212
P P 0.26 0.61 1.00 0.62 0.12 303
741
Probability of not completely default
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total Total 0.31 0.74 0.95 0.72 0.12 741
FDI FDI 0.57 0.85 0.95 0.83 0.09 18
G FDI 0.35 0.49 0.74 0.51 0.13 11
P FDI 0.64 0.83 0.95 0.82 0.08 29
FDI G 0.73 0.83 0.91 0.84 0.04 19
G G 0.37 0.69 0.87 0.69 0.11 51
P G 0.31 0.68 0.87 0.67 0.10 71
FDI P 0.35 0.65 0.84 0.67 0.14 27
G P 0.35 0.69 0.92 0.69 0.13 212
P P 0.42 0.76 0.94 0.75 0.10 303
741 28
Table 5    Predicted probability of enforcement by ownership, (2) in procurement 
(Source) Author   
 
From S to F
Predicted mean probability of no default
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total Total 0.02 0.32 0.91 0.34 0.15 687
FDI FDI 0.31 0.49 0.72 0.51 0.09 14
G FDI 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.04 20
P FDI 0.08 0.26 0.64 0.27 0.11 98
FDI G 0.07 0.13 0.26 0.14 0.06 9
G G 0.09 0.26 0.61 0.29 0.14 55
P G 0.09 0.40 0.91 0.41 0.15 210
FDI P 0.10 0.27 0.64 0.26 0.12 31
G P 0.14 0.32 0.55 0.33 0.10 43
P P 0.11 0.35 0.68 0.36 0.12 207
687
Predicted mean probability of being not delayed
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total Total 0.16 0.61 0.99 0.62 0.13 687
FDI FDI 0.61 0.72 0.89 0.71 0.07 14
G FDI 0.39 0.53 0.80 0.58 0.13 20
P FDI 0.32 0.56 0.80 0.55 0.12 98
FDI G 0.16 0.35 0.55 0.34 0.14 9
G G 0.37 0.57 0.87 0.60 0.11 55
P G 0.41 0.70 0.99 0.70 0.11 210
G P 0.37 0.56 0.80 0.58 0.10 43
FDI P 0.34 0.56 0.85 0.57 0.12 31
P P 0.36 0.60 0.86 0.62 0.10 207
613
Predicted mean probability of being not completely defaulted
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total Total 0.26 0.72 0.94 0.71 0.12 687
FDI FDI 0.71 0.79 0.91 0.81 0.06 14
G FDI 0.26 0.48 0.66 0.49 0.11 20
P FDI 0.44 0.72 0.94 0.72 0.11 98
FDI G 0.70 0.76 0.90 0.80 0.09 9
G G 0.47 0.66 0.90 0.68 0.10 55
P G 0.34 0.68 0.89 0.67 0.11 210
FDI P 0.36 0.73 0.89 0.70 0.13 31
G P 0.61 0.76 0.87 0.75 0.08 43
P P 0.41 0.77 0.92 0.74 0.11 207
687 29
Table 6    Trade credit ratio function (1) : in sales 
  (Source) Author. (Note) 1) Fractional logit estimator. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate marginal effect when x change from 0 to 1. 2) 
Bold is coefficient with 5% significance.       
Trade credit ratio in sales
Dependent: Ratio of payment after delivery in sales transaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log Likelihood -445 -420 -419 -445 -427 -399 -442 -432 -439
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 0.64 0.61 1.16 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.64 0.63 0.63
AIC 1.21 1.17 1.14 1.21 1.18 1.09 1.20 1.20 1.20
# of obs 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736
Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z|
Probability of enforcement 
ｓ  on no default dummy -0.193 0.16 0.24 -1.39 0.23 0.00 4.75 1.08 0.00
ｓ  on delayed dummy 0.1 0.10 0.31 -0.6 0.14 0.000 7.00 0.750 0.00
s  on complete default dummy 0.25 0.08 0.002 -0.1 0.12 0.26 2.11 0.60 0.00
Quadratics of probability of enforcement 
ｓ^2  on no default dummy ) -11.3 2.707 0
ｓ^2  on delayed dummy -10.6 1.177 0.00
s^2  on complete default dummy -2.45 0.78 0.00
Buyer-Seller Ownerships (dummy)
dGG_C 0.78 0.25 0.00 0.76 0.26 0.00 0.52 0.26 0.04
dGF_C 1.48 0.39 0.00 1.44 0.41 0.00 1.36 0.42 0.00
dGP_C 1.03 0.20 0.00 0.87 0.21 0.00 0.54 0.20 0.01
dFF_C 2.07 0.38 0.00 1.76 0.39 0.00 1.48 0.39 0.00
dFG_C 0.69 0.52 0.19 0.91 0.52 0.08 0.62 0.54 0.25
dFP_C 0.37 0.28 0.19 0.14 0.28 0.62 -0.10 0.29 0.73
dPG_C 0.73 0.12 0.00 0.67 0.14 0.00 0.42 0.14 0.00
dPF_C 0.67 0.30 0.03 0.69 0.31 0.03 0.45 0.32 0.16
(dPP_C) 30
Table 7    Trade credit ratio function (2)    in procurement 
 
(Source) Author. (Note) 1) Fractional logit estimator. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate marginal effect when x change from 0 
to 1. 2) Bold is coefficient with 5% significance.       
Trade credit ratio in procurement
Dependent: Ratio of payment after delivery in sales transaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log Likelihood -417 -413 -372 -417 -411 -365 -412 -413 -411
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 0.67 0.67 2.03 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.66
AIC 1.23 1.24 1.10 1.23 1.23 1.08 1.21 1.24 1.21
# of obs 682 682 682 682 682 682 682 682 682
Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z|
Probability of enforcement 
ｓ  on no default dummy -0.67 0.16 0.00 -1.72 0.281 0 6.47 1.01 0.00
ｓ  on delayed dummy -0.12 0.10 0.21 -0.4 0.178 0.016 7.566 0.71 0.00
s  on complete default dummy 0.03 0.087 0.71 0.03 0.15 0.85 2.66 0.63 0
Quadratics of probability of enforcement 
ｓ^2  on no default dummy ) -16.7 2.534 0
ｓ^2  on delayed dummy -11.6 1.078 0.00
s^2  on complete default dummy -3.53 0.839 0
Buyer-Seller Ownerships (dummy)
dGG_C 0.43 0.218 0.046 0.19 0.24 0.42 -0.08 0.24 0.72
dGF_C 0.83 0.377 0.028 0.94 0.39 0.02 0.68 0.39 0.08
dGP_C 1.54 0.362 0 0.96 0.36 0.01 0.63 0.36 0.08
dFF_C 1.15 0.239 0 0.82 0.25 0.00 0.55 0.26 0.04
dFG_C 0.29 0.42 0.485 0.19 0.43 0.66 0.02 0.46 0.96
dFP_C 0.67 0.282 0.017 0.46 0.30 0.12 0.19 0.30 0.52
dPG_C 0.53 0.16 0.001 0.13 0.17 0.44 -0.19 0.15 0.22
dPF_C 0.41 0.179 0.021 0.19 0.20 0.33 -0.07 0.20 0.74
(dPP_C)  31
Table  8  Trade  credit  volume  functions  
 
 
(Source) Author. (Note) 1) Exponential quasi maximum likelihood estimator. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate marginal effect when x change from 0 to 1. 
2) Bold is coefficient with 5% significance 
Trade credit volume in procurement
Dependent: Trade credit volume from the supplier to the surveyed firm 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Likelihood -4767 -5253 -3681 -6707 -4431 -10022 -5577
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 7.8 30.2 32.2 701.2 163.3 1001.2 266.2
AIC 14.79 16.17 15.74 20.64 18.95 30.84 23.85
# of obs 645 650 468 650 468 650 468
Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z|
Probability of enforcement 
ｓ  on no default dummy 32.32 2.35 0.00 21.78 1.35 0.00
ｓ  on delayed dummy 12.94 0.804 0.00 10.60 0.58 0.00
s  on complete default dummy 9.660 0.25 0.00 9.150 0.374 0.00
Cash in hand of buyer 
cashflow2001 -0.00002 0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.00 -0.0001 0.00 0.01 -0.0001 0.00 0.00
cashstock2001  0.0006 0.00 0.00 0.0008 0.00 0.00 0.0026 0.00 0.01 0.0045 0.00 0.00
Constant  6.14 0.13 0.00  32
  
Table  9  Transaction  volume  functions  
 
(Source) Author. (Note) 1) Exponential quasi maximum likelihood estimator. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate marginal effect when x change from 0 to 1. 
2) Bold is coefficient with 5% significance.     
Transaction volume in procurement
Dependent: Transaction volume from the supplier to the surveyed firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Likelihood -5821 -4112 -7023 -4669 -10345 -5837
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 28 38 532 130 831 226
AIC 18 17 22 20 32 25
# of obs 652 473 652 473 652 473
Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z|
Probability of enforcement 
ｓ  on no default dummy 34.02 2.026 0 23.04 1.21 0.00
ｓ  on delayed dummy 13.82 0.67 0.00 11.27 0.52 0.00
s  on complete default dumm 10.88 0.24 0.00 10.29 0.43 0.00
Cash in hand of buyer 
cashflow2001 -3E-05 0.00 0.00 -8E-05 0.00 0.00 -0.0001 0.00 0.00
cashstock2001  9E-04 0.00 0.00 0.0027 0.00 0.00 0.0047 0.00 0.00 33
Table 10    Positive external effect of “buyer’s enforcement technology” 
 (Source) Author. (Note) 1) Fractional logit estimator for trade credit ratio. Exponential quasi 
maximum likelihood for trade credit volume. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate marginal 
effect when x change from 0 to 1. 2) Bold is coefficient with 5% significance.       
External effect of enforcement 
Dependent  Ratio of trade credti from the supplier to the firm 
(1) (2) (3)
Log Likelihood -406 -407 -407
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 0.67 0.67 0.67
AIC 1.22 1.23 1.23
# of obs 665 665 665
Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z|
Probability of enforcement from the firm to the customer 
ｓ  on no default dummy -0.09 0.17 0.60
ｓ  on delayed dummy 0.06 0.10 0.558
s  on complete default dumm 0.11 0.09 0.20
Dependent  Trade credit volume 
(4) (5) (6)
Log Likelihood -4859 -5816 -7591
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 15.7 229.2 1225.3
AIC 15.6 18.7 24.4
# of obs 622 622 622
Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z|
Probability of enforcement from the firm to the customer 
ｓ  on no default dummy 27.50 1.97 0.00
ｓ  on delayed dummy 12.73 0.7 0.0
s  on complete default dumm 9.21 0.20 0.00
Dependent Transaction  volume
(7) (8) (9)
Log Likelihood -5661 -5992 -8256
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 74.9 68.7 304.9
AIC 19.3 20.5 28.2
# of obs 586 586 586
Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z| Coef. S.E. P>|z|
Probability of enforcement from the firm to the customer 
ｓ  on no default dummy 33.70 1.83 0.00
ｓ  on delayed dummy 14.34 0.58 0.00
s  on complete default dumm 11.71 0.52 0.00 34
Appendix    1    Payment instruments between customers and surveyed firms 
 




(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 10 100 23.86 30.00 22
G FDI 0 0 10 0.79 2.51 19
P FDI 0 0 100 22.30 35.97 40
FDI G 0 20 100 32.83 40.42 23
G G 0 0 100 9.72 21.61 88
P G 0 10 100 32.93 36.99 92
G P 0 0 100 8.69 20.94 312
FDI P 0 10 100 27.92 36.00 36




(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 20 100 24.55 30.04 22
G FDI 0 30 100 39.47 44.62 19
P FDI 0 5 100 34.23 41.98 40
FDI G 0 20 100 43.04 45.17 23
G G 0 50 100 48.35 42.57 88
P G 0 30 100 40.76 42.22 92
FDI P 0 20 100 40.14 41.88 35
G P 0 30 100 44.66 45.10 313




(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 0 100 21.82 39.11 22
G FDI 0 0 100 43.68 49.13 19
P FDI 0 0 100 26.75 40.36 40
FDI G 0 0 100 13.04 30.96 23
G G 0 0 100 29.94 39.66 89
P G 0 0 100 19.24 31.80 92
FDI P 0 0 100 30.14 44.09 36
G P 0 0 100 37.38 42.22 315







   
*bank draft
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 0 100 29.05 39.74 21
G FDI 0 0 100 9.74 23.83 19
P FDI 0 0 100 10.75 28.59 40
FDI G 0 0 100 10.87 29.99 23
G G 0 0 100 12.47 24.65 87
P G 0 0 80 5.16 15.38 92
FDI P 0 0 30 2.00 6.77 35
G P 0 0 100 8.01 20.01 313




(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 0 15 0.71 3.27 21
G FDI 0 0 30 4.74 11.24 19
P FDI 0 0 100 2.80 15.88 40
FDI G 0 0 5 0.22 1.04 23
G G 0 0 70 2.88 10.13 86
P G 0 0 55 0.71 5.85 91
FDI P 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 35
G P 0 0 100 2.30 13.14 311




(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 21
G FDI 0 0 30 1.58 6.88 19
P FDI 0 0 80 3.63 15.19 40
FDI G 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 23
G G 0 0 80 1.34 8.98 87
P G 0 0 90 1.09 9.43 92
FDI P 0 0 30 0.86 5.07 35
G P 0 0 50 0.51 4.31 311
P P 0 0 100 1.26 7.46 408
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Appendix  2  Marketing  areas  
 
                                                             
*Share of main market (1) export   (in sales)
*Total 
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 56 100 46.83 37.92 23
G FDI 0 0 99 10.00 26.24 14
P FDI 0 0 100 33.03 44.59 32
FDI G 0 0 100 19.61 32.49 22
G G 0 0 70 2.10 10.24 63
P G 0 0 100 10.57 28.11 81
FDI P 0 0 100 23.13 36.64 34
G P 0 0 100 1.76 10.18 271
P P 0 0 100 8.53 24.13 371
911
*Share of main market (1) export   (in procurement)
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 10 80 32.18 32.77 17
G FDI 0 0 100 10.74 26.11 23
P FDI 0 0 80 1.93 10.48 111
FDI G 0 1 100 18.00 33.84 10
G G 0 0 100 6.85 20.75 68
P G 0 0 100 5.45 20.40 259
FDI P 0 1 100 35.19 44.74 31
G P 0 0 100 10.58 28.64 65
P P 0 0 100 9.77 25.03 277
861
*Share of main market (2)  home city  (in sales)
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 25 80 24.13 21.35 23
G FDI 0 10 100 29.30 32.49 20
P FDI 0 15 100 27.11 36.76 35
FDI G 0 60 100 58.57 39.68 23
G G 0 50 100 50.04 34.08 91
P G 0 50 100 49.10 37.99 93
FDI P 0 20 100 35.24 36.13 38
G P 0 30 100 41.31 35.47 319
P P 0 40 100 43.86 34.13 420
1039
*Share of main market  (2)  home city  (in procurement)
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 12.5 50 17.05 16.12 20
G FDI 0 50 100 50.00 36.24 27
P FDI 0 40 100 44.98 33.31 126
FDI G 0 15 100 25.14 26.68 14
G G 0 30 100 42.80 35.51 83
P G 0 40 100 44.18 35.49 285
FDI P 0 25 100 34.90 37.48 31
G P 0 60 100 56.39 37.52 85
P P 0 30 100 40.08 35.13 332
(Source) JICA PBOC Survey and DRC-IDE Survey 1003 37
 Appendix  3  Competitiveness  and  bargaining  power                    
 
 
*Competitiveness of goods if the good is unique=1, if the good is commodity=0 (in sales)
*Total 
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 1 1 0.59 0.50 22
G FDI 0 0 1 0.42 0.51 19
P FDI 0 0 1 0.44 0.50 41
FDI G 0 1 1 0.59 0.50 22
G G 0 1 1 0.51 0.50 92
P G 0 0 1 0.21 0.41 92
FDI P 0 1 1 0.56 0.50 36
G P 0 1 1 0.50 0.50 311
P P 0 0 1 0.29 0.45 421
1056
*Share of the products in  the supplier's input ( in procurement) 
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 10 35 100 50.93 34.45 20
G FDI 2 30 95 37.96 22.12 24
P FDI 2 30 100 37.75 26.20 119
FDI G 5 25 100 34.00 28.19 12
G G 2 40 100 45.67 27.60 77
P G 1 30 190 39.69 29.22 258
FDI P 3 20 90 28.81 23.90 29
G P 3 30 80 34.42 22.58 77
P P 0 30 100 37.83 27.23 290
906
*Rivarly  if no rival=0, one rivals=1, a few rival=2, numerous rivals=3   ( in sales)
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 2 3 1.90 0.89 21
G FDI 0 2 3 1.78 0.94 18
P FDI 0 2 3 2.08 0.73 40
FDI G 0 2.5 3 1.86 1.36 22
G G 0 2 3 2.02 1.01 92
P G 0 3 3 2.38 0.97 92
FDI P 0 3 3 2.28 1.03 36
G P 0 2 3 2.19 0.81 318
P P 0 3 3 2.35 0.86 413
1052
* Do you have potential substitute supplier? Yes=1 No=0  ( in procurement )
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 1 1 0.75 0.44 20
G FDI 0 1 1 0.74 0.45 27
P FDI 0 1 1 0.75 0.44 122
FDI G 0 1 1 0.86 0.36 14
G G 0 1 1 0.81 0.39 79
P G 0 1 1 0.85 0.36 276
FDI P 0 1 1 0.82 0.39 33
G P 0 1 1 0.84 0.37 85
P P 0 1 1 0.91 0.29 336
(Source) JICA PBOC Survey and DRC-IDE Survey 38
Appendix 4    Default experiences and ex post management   
          
 
*no default experience in between 1999 to 2003
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 1 1 0.61 0.50 23
G FDI 0 0 1 0.26 0.45 19
P FDI 0 1 1 0.51 0.51 39
FDI G 0 0 1 0.17 0.39 23
G G 0 0 1 0.38 0.49 93
P G 0 0 1 0.43 0.50 93
FDI P 0 0 1 0.32 0.47 38
G P 0 0 1 0.35 0.48 319
P P 0 0 1 0.36 0.48 425
*being completely defaulted 
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 0 1 0.13 0.34 23
G FDI 0 0 1 0.37 0.50 19
P FDI 0 0 1 0.13 0.34 39
FDI G 0 0 1 0.26 0.45 23
G G 0 0 1 0.30 0.46 93
P G 0 0 1 0.30 0.46 93
FDI P 0 0 1 0.29 0.46 38
G P 0 0 1 0.29 0.45 318
P P 0 0 1 0.27 0.45 424
1070
*When default happens, stopped transaction
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 0 1 0.44 0.53 9
G FDI 0 0 1 0.14 0.36 14
P FDI 0 0 1 0.39 0.50 23
FDI G 0 1 1 0.58 0.51 19
G G 0 0 1 0.46 0.50 61
P G 0 0 1 0.47 0.50 58
FDI P 0 0 1 0.43 0.50 28
G P 0 0 1 0.32 0.47 214
P P 0 0 1 0.43 0.50 289
715
*When default happens, suited
Borrower Lender 
(Buyer) (Seller) min median max  mean s.d.  n
FDI FDI 0 0 1 0.33 0.50 9
G FDI 0 0 1 0.29 0.47 14
P FDI 0 0 1 0.30 0.47 23
FDI G 0 0 1 0.26 0.45 19
G G 0 0 1 0.30 0.46 61
P G 0 0 1 0.28 0.45 58
FDI P 0 0 1 0.14 0.36 28
G P 0 0 1 0.28 0.45 214
P P 0 0 1 0.25 0.44 289
(Source) JICA PBOC survey and DRC-IDE Survey 39
Appendix  5   Predicted  probability  of  enforcement,  by  region  
(Source) Author 
From F to C
Predicted mean probability of no default
min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total 0.04 0.31 0.93 0.33 0.15 741
Beijing 0.04 0.38 0.90 0.39 0.15 226
Dongguan 0.07 0.28 0.93 0.29 0.11 136
Xian 0.05 0.36 0.74 0.36 0.14 195
Yibin 0.07 0.23 0.84 0.26 0.13 184
741
Predicted mean probability of not being delayed
min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total 0.21 0.61 1.00 0.60 0.13 741
Beijing 0.21 0.60 0.98 0.60 0.13 226
Dongguan 0.42 0.68 1.00 0.70 0.08 136
Xian 0.25 0.58 0.82 0.58 0.12 195
Yibin 0.26 0.54 0.97 0.55 0.14 184
741
Predicted mean probability of not being completely defaul
min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total 0.31 0.74 0.95 0.72 0.12 741
Beijing 0.54 0.78 0.95 0.78 0.09 226
Dongguan 0.31 0.61 0.79 0.58 0.12 136
Xian 0.38 0.77 0.94 0.77 0.09 195
Yibin 0.46 0.71 0.92 0.71 0.09 184
741
From S to F
Predicted mean probability of no default
min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total 0.02 0.32 0.91 0.34 0.15 687
Beijing 0.06 0.37 0.78 0.38 0.14 200
Dongguan 0.08 0.30 0.72 0.31 0.13 116
Xian 0.05 0.37 0.77 0.38 0.14 194
Yibin 0.02 0.26 0.91 0.29 0.15 177
687
Predicted mean probability of not beeing delayed
min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total 0.16 0.61 0.99 0.62 0.13 687
Beijing 0.16 0.59 0.89 0.61 0.12 200
Dongguan 0.50 0.71 0.91 0.71 0.10 116
Xian 0.32 0.61 0.86 0.61 0.12 194
Yibin 0.32 0.59 0.99 0.60 0.13 177
687
Predicted mean probability of not beeing completely defaulted
min median max  mean s.d.  n
Total 0.26 0.72 0.94 0.71 0.12 687
Beijing 0.41 0.77 0.92 0.76 0.09 200
Dongguan 0.26 0.60 0.82 0.59 0.11 116
Xian 0.48 0.76 0.94 0.76 0.09 194
Yibin 0.35 0.66 0.88 0.66 0.11 177
687 40
Appendix 6    Trade credit ratio function in reduced form, in sales transaction 
  (Source) Author. (Note) 1) Fractional logit estimator. Coefficients for dummy variables indicate marginal effect when x changes from 0 
to 1. 2) Bold coefficients indicates 5 % and above significance.      
Trade credit ratio in sales
D ependent: R atio of paym ent after delivery in sales transaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Likelihood -597.4 -576.6 -569.4 -484.8 -468.3 -419.8 -176.9 -151.2
Pearson Residuals(1/df) 0.648 0.642 0.637 0.6 0.6 0.622 0.587 0.589
AIC 1.204 1.198 1.190 1.2 1.2 1.190 1.189 1.214
# of obs 1001 984 984 843 816 741 333 287
Share of payment instruments (% ) Coef. S.E. P>| z| Coef . S.E. P>| z| Coef . S.E. P>| z| Coef . S.E. P>| z| Coef . S.E. P>| z| Coef. S.E. P>| z| Coef. S.E. P>| z| Coef . S.E. P>| z|
cash -0.005 0.00 0.00 -0.007 0.00 0.00 -0.009 0.00 0.00 -0.007 0.00 0.00 -0.007 0.00 0.01 -0.015 0.01 0.00 -0.017 0.00 0.00 -0.019 0.00 0.00
cheque 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.002 0.00 0.06 0.003 0.00 0.06 0.005 0.00 0.01 0.004 0.00 0.08 -0.002 0.00 0.65 -0.002 0.00 0.47 -0.005 0.00 0.24
b anknote 0.004 0.00 0.06 0.000 0.00 0.93 0.000 0.00 0.81 0.001 0.00 0.61 0.000 0.00 0.85 -0.006 0.01 0.20 -0.007 0.00 0.12 -0.009 0.00 0.06
b ankdraft 0.004 0.00 0.14 0.001 0.00 0.75 0.001 0.00 0.65 0.002 0.00 0.42 0.002 0.00 0.54 -0.005 0.01 0.38 -0.003 0.01 0.64 -0.005 0.01 0.38
creditcard 0.007 0.01 0.36 0.007 0.01 0.41 0.007 0.01 0.36 0.007 0.01 0.38 0.007 0.01 0.43 0.007 0.01 0.42 0.015 0.01 0.26 0.015 0.01 0.27
(C om m ercial draft)
Buyer-Seller Ownerships (dummy)
dGG_C 0. 388 0.21 0.07 0.538 0.21 0.01 0.490 0.26 0.06 0.567 0.26 0.03 0.626 0.29 0.03 0.142 0.35 0.69 0.109 0.41 0.79
dGF_C 1.344 0.40 0.00 1.128 0.43 0.01 1.139 0.44 0.01 1.211 0.44 0.01 1.252 0.45 0.01 0.871 0.65 0.18 0.752 0.68 0.27
dGP_C 0.288 0.19 0.13 0.297 0.19 0.12 0.366 0.21 0.08 0.393 0.21 0.06 0.555 0.21 0.01 1.039 0.30 0.00 1.016 0.32 0.00
dFF_C 1.341 0.41 0.00 1.080 0.41 0.01 0.827 0.41 0.04 0.861 0.41 0.04 1.053 0.42 0.01 1.177 0.62 0.06 1.124 0.66 0.09
dFG_C 0.729 0.47 0.12 0.958 0.47 0.04 0.389 0.54 0.47 0.407 0.54 0.45 0.566 0.58 0.33 1.302 0.68 0.06 1.085 0.67 0.10
dFP_C 0.007 0.25 0.98 -0.021 0.26 0.94 -0.094 0.30 0.76 -0.072 0.30 0.81 -0.216 0.31 0.49 -0.389 0.55 0.48 -0.480 0.78 0.54
dPG_C 0.263 0.13 0.04 0.416 0.13 0.00 0.404 0.14 0.01 0.471 0.15 0.00 0.437 0.16 0.01 0.714 0.24 0.00 0.683 0.26 0.01
dPF_C 0.487 0.28 0.08 0.391 0.28 0.16 0.240 0.29 0.41 0.296 0.29 0.32 0.256 0.33 0.44 0.622 0.43 0.15 0.319 0.43 0.45
(dPP_C )
Administarative region (dummy)
Bei j i ng  0.334 0.15 0.03 0.313 0.16 0.06 0.283 0.17 0.06 0.239 0.18 0.18 0.627 0.25 0.01 0.670 0.27 0.01
Dongguang  -0.376 0.18 0.03 -0.489 0.19 0.01 -0.437 0.20 0.01 -0.487 0.21 0.02 -0.437 0.30 0.15 -0.411 0.33 0.21
Xi an  -0.296 0.15 0.06 -0.302 0.17 0.07 -0.247 0.17 0.07 -0.279 0.18 0.12 -0.358 0.27 0.19 -0.394 0.29 0.18
(Yibn)
Share of market site (% )
H om e city  -0.003 0.00 0.17 -0.003 0.00 0.13 -0.004 0.00 0.07 0.003 0.00 0.30
Export  0.003 0.00 0.35 0.003 0.00 0.33 0.003 0.00 0.30 0.005 0.00 0.25
Competitiveness of goods
Unique( If goods is unique to customer==1, IF NOT ==0) -0.009 0.12 0.94 -0.014 0.13 0.91 -0.215 0.22 0.33
# of rival(no rivaly=0, few rival=1, a few rival=2, numerous rival=3)  0.025 0.07 0.71 0.046 0.07 0.53 -0.009 0.12 0.94
Length of transaction 
start year of transaction 0.000 0.00 0.19 0.000 0.00 0.61
Default experiences (dummy)
No default  -0.377 0.35 0.29 -0.717 0.38 0.06
delayed 0.025 0.19 0.90 -0.052 0.20 0.80
(Completely default)
Ex post management to default (dummy)
changeterms 0.413 0.24 0.09 0.518 0.25 0.04
stoptrade 0.681 0.25 0.01 0.772 0.26 0.00
Suit 0.591 0.23 0.01 0.618 0.24 0.01